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Abstract 
 
The Orthodox Church has been intimately wrapped up in the Russian state since 
Russia’s conversion to Christianity in 988.  The relationship between the two is most 
succinctly wrapped up in Tsar Nicholas I’s so-called triad: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and 
Nationality.” This paper seeks to explain the manner in which the Orthodox Church 
reasserted itself as a force in Russian politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 up through the first administration of President Vladimir Putin. The church under 
Patriarch Alexy powerfully reinserted itself into affairs of state during the August 1991 
coup attempt, while its relationship with the state after the independence of Russian 
Federation was driven far more by the government. The 1997 law on religious freedom 
represented a sea change in the collaboration between church and state, paving the way 
for much more open collaboration in domestic and foreign policy. 
Additional consideration is given to ethnodoxy, an idea proposed by University of 
Western Michigan sociologist Vyachslav Karpov which explicates how the church can 
exert such powerful influence in a country with very low statistical levels of religiosity. 
The cultural impact of Orthodoxy on Russian consciousness pre-1917 was brought 
forward by first the church and later the state as the Soviet Union broke apart to help 
develop a new Russian identity rooted in tradition. This church-state collaboration 
extended beyond simple ethnic nationalism and came to a core part of the policymaking 
apparatus of the Russian government. 
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 Nationalism in contemporary Russia both has its roots in the distant past and has 
emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union.  The Russian Federation emerged in 1991 as 
a multiethnic state unified on lines other than the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism 
that typified the Soviet period.  Seeking a new basis for unification and a return to 
stability after the tumultuous 1990s, the Russian state eventually turned to an increasingly 
close relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church.  The Church had formed an 
important part of Russian national mythology dating far into the past, and had more 
recently cultivated a practice of government collaboration to survive through the 
Communist era.  With the Russian Orthodox Church, Presidents Yeltsin and Putin found 
a willing partner in the development of a new Russian national identity rooted in 
perceived longstanding traditions.  The church and state have used this partnership both 
to drive this national cohesion and to direct policy priorities both domestically and 
abroad. 
 The lengthy history of the Russian Orthodox Church and its interactions with the 
state necessitates a certain level of historical analysis before any serious discussion of 
modern relations can be embarked upon.  The thousand-year history of Orthodoxy in 
Russia is a complex one, the close relationship between religion and state policy a 
practice with deep roots.  Until the Russian Revolution, the state carefully cultivated a 
connection between Orthodoxy and Russian identity so strong that it has persisted in 
some form through the dramatic changes of the past century.  The focus of this paper is 
on the present day cooption of Orthodoxy by political forces in the creation of Russian 
national identity; with a brief coverage of the prior history of this relationship, the 
modern situation will become far clearer. 
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 Prince Vladimir of Kiev adopted a very specific form of Christianity in AD 988, 
one which held to dual Byzantine ideas of government hierarchy and church-state 
relations.  In government, Orthodox theology held that the structure of Earthly 
governance should mirror heaven—one authoritative figure on top of a wholly 
centralized system.  During the late medieval era this took the form of the consolidation 
of power under the Muscovite princes who eventually took the title “tsar”—a 
russification of Roman “Caesar.”  Grand Prince of Muscovy Ivan IV (otherwise known as 
Ivan the Terrible) was the monarch who first took on this title.  This centralized apparatus 
persisted into the Soviet period, pushing the state in a centralizing direction under strong 
leaders such as Vladimir Lenin or Joseph Stalin.  Church-state relations were a more 
confusing aspect of this legacy; the Russian Orthodox Church holds to a theology known 
as symphonia.  Symphonia emerged as the contrasting belief to the Western doctrine of 
the two swords, arguing that instead of existing separately, the spheres of church and 
state should work together to create good governance.  This viewpoint, arguably initiated 
by the Emperor Constantine but clearly embedded in Byzantine state character by the 
reign of Justinian in the early 6th century, holds that the political leadership and 
ecclesiastical leadership are called to work together as instruments in an orchestra—
different in spheres of influence but equal in power.1  The policy was officially adopted 
in Russia under Ivan IV with the promulgation of Стогдав (Stoglav; The Book of One 
Hundred Chapters) in 1551. 
While abandoned by the state with the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, 
symphonia remains the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church today.  The 
                                                
1 J.W. Warhola, lecture in Medieval Political Theory, Orono, Maine, 8 September 2015. 
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Russian Orthodox Church supported the coalescence of supreme power under the 
Muscovite princes during the struggle against the Mongol-Tatar yoke and continued to 
provide theological underpinnings for their dominance into the 20th century.  From 988 
until that point, “mutual aid linked the two together irrevocably, both in institutions and 
in the mind of the people, while the princes’ problem of maintaining political 
independence from emperor and patriarch left the church perhaps less independent of the 
state than at Byzantium.”2  Tsar Nicholas I made this relationship even more explicit in 
1833 when he promulgated his “Triad of Official Nationality”: pravoslaviye, 
samoderzhaviye, narodnost’ (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationalism).  This descriptor laid 
out the foundations on which the Russian state was based in no uncertain terms—the 
church sitting right atop alongside the government.  This pattern of relations broke down 
following the Soviet rise to power; while a centralized leadership model could persist 
through the ideological shift, such a collaborative effort in the realm of governance 
clearly could not and the state had little interest in propping up an antiquated, 
superstitious body.3 
The position of the church was weakened during the Soviet period, but its role in 
Russian society also underwent a powerful evolution. The locus for a mildly pro-Church 
reorientation can be found at the outbreak of World War II and the Orthodox response 
therein; Dr. Philip Walters, editor of Religion, State, and Society, notes that in the 
aftermath of Hitler’s invasion, “the first to appeal to the patriotic spirit of the Soviet 
                                                
2 Dev Murarka, “Religion in Russia Today: Renewal and Conflict,” in Economic and Political Weekly 28 
(1993): 2842. 
3 For a generalized coverage of Russian history including the conversion of Prince Vladimir and later 
relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state, see Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark 
Steinburg, A History of Russia. 
 
 
4 
 
people and call on them to resist the fascist aggressor was Metropolitan Sergi.”4  More 
commonly known as Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Sergi was the effective leader of 
Russian Orthodoxy from 1925-1944.  Soviet estimates from the mid-1930s concluded 
that around 57% of the population remained Orthodox believers at the time; the results of 
a question on religious belief were suppressed from the 1937 Soviet census and the 
question did not reappear in 1939.  Regardless of specific numbers, it is evident that the 
Church remained a potent force in a moral sense to influence the Russian population; 
Stalin recognized this and in 1943 met with Sergius to form an alliance which would 
typify relations for the next 50 years, the tacit agreement mentioned above.  While 
Walters notes that a campaign of deception to convince the world that the Russian 
Orthodox Church was operating as an autonomous institution took place, he does take a 
fairly optimistic view of Church autonomy from 1943-59 and after 1964.  This view has 
been seriously challenged by more recent scholarship and seems unlikely to hold up to a 
historian’s scrutiny; a better descriptor of the period would perhaps be continuous low-
level harassment and tight state control.5
                                                
4 Philip Walters, “The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State,” in The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (483, 1986), 139. 
5 This particular topic is one frequently addressed as a key antecedent by modern scholars writing on the 
Putin administration’s relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church.  See for example John Anderson, 
“Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?” in Journal of International Affairs 
(61:1, 2007). 
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 It can be said that the character of the Russian state through its various iterations 
has maintained certain similarities.  Each Russian state has been to varying degrees 
autocratic, highly centralized, heavily militarized, and expansionistic in outlook.  While 
the latter two are less than germane to the topic of this study, the former are in many 
ways a product of the historically pervasive influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on 
society.  An autocratic power structure was both needed to throw off Tatar domination 
and in line with the stated church goal of mirroring the model of heaven on Earth.  
Centralization was again critical to both of these goals.  Even amidst an official policy of 
atheism, this cultural impact of Orthodoxy could not be undermined over the course of 
the seventy-year history of the Soviet Union.  It can additionally be said to persist today.6 
 Religious affiliation declined markedly during the Soviet period, making it 
difficult to explain the central role which Orthodoxy occupies in modern Russian national 
consciousness.  While early in the Soviet period when repression of the Church was at an 
all-time high, “the loyalty of the Soviet public to the virtually nonexistent church 
remained substantial,” this affiliation later dramatically declined.7  By the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, only 31% of Russians identified as Orthodox Christians while 61% 
professed no religious affiliation.8  Interestingly, at the same time that 31% professed an 
Orthodox identity, only 11% of Russians described themselves as at least “somewhat 
religious.”  Here can be seen the first inklings of the suggestion that affiliation with 
Orthodoxy is not tied so much to genuine religious belief as to its long-term impact on 
the Russian cultural psyche. 
                                                
6 Information on the historic development of the Russian state distilled from the lectures of James Warhola 
in “Russian Government and Politics” at the University of Maine during the autumn semester 2015. 
7 Walters, “The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State,” 139. 
8 Pew Research Center, “Russians Return to Religion, but Not to Church,” Washington, D.C. (2014), 1. 
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Ethnodoxy 
Before progressing to discuss in detail the role of the church in the collapse of 
communism and the emergence of a new Russian identity, the issue of belief must be 
addressed.  As noted above, by the mid-1930s around 57% of Soviet citizens identified as 
religiously Orthodox.9  Shortly afterward, the question vanished from Soviet censuses 
and data is thus unavailable.  It seems clear from post-Soviet surveys, though, that 
religious affiliation continued to decline throughout the Soviet period and that by the 
Gorbachev years believers were a distinctive minority.  The question remains, then, how 
the Russian Orthodox Church was able to exert influence among a population that did not 
believe in its dogma.  University of Western Michigan sociologist Vyacheslav Karpov 
coined the term ethnodoxy to explain this phenomenon in a 2012 paper which employed 
modern Russia as a case study.  He describes ethnodoxy as, “an ideology which rigidly 
links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant faith.”10  In short, the concept suggested 
that in a nation state where popular identification has long been linked to a religious 
identity, the secular bond can come to be conflated with a dominant religious tradition, as 
in the case of Russian Orthodoxy.  The people may not come to believe in the tenets of 
the religion, but their group identification with it persists into a more secular era.  A 
modern example of this phenomenon could be the large number of Americans who do not 
attend church services but continue to identify with Protestant Christianity.  Karpov 
discusses the emergence of so-called “ethnic religions,” faith groups to which one 
belongs without believing.  In short, “at the societal level, the power of beliefs conflating 
                                                
9 Walters, “The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State,” 139. 
10 Vyacheslav Karpov, Elena Lisovskaya, and David Barry, “Ethnodoxy: How Popular Ideologies Fuse 
Religious and Ethnic Identities,” in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (51:4, 2012), 639. 
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faith and ethnos profoundly manifests itself in highly secularized settings, where 
individual-level piety is relatively low.”11  
Ethnodoxy as a concept sought to explicate the unique situation in modern Russia 
wherein religious belief among the population is exceptionally low, but regard for and 
identification with the Russian Orthodox Church remains exceptionally high.  Karpov 
suggested that an identification with Orthodoxy had become a core tenet of Russian 
ethnic nationalism; his conceptualization created seven core criteria for applying the term 
and found all seven of these present in the Russian case.   This connection meshed 
closely with the highly unusual nature of Russian self-identification—there is not a single 
Russian identity in the Russian language, and connotations are key.   Some small 
consideration of the Russian language terminology is here essential in understanding the 
emerging role of Orthodoxy. 
In the Russian language, two separate words are used to refer to the English 
“Russian:” russki and rossiyski.   Rossiyski refers to the political context, a citizen of the 
Russian Federation or previously of the Soviet Union; the term is roughly analogous to 
the former term sovetski.   Russki, on the other hand, refers to Russian in the ethnic or 
cultural context.   It is this second “Russian” which has been wrapped up in Orthodoxy—
Russians grew to expect that if someone was ethnically Russian, then they would be at 
least culturally Orthodox.   A warmth toward the Church persisted even as religious 
identification decreased.   At the time of Karpov’s study, “85 percent of Russians agreed 
or strongly agreed with the idea of inborn faithfulness…”12 Karpov’s study established 
                                                
11 Ibid., 639. 
12 Ibid., 648. 
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this conflation which helps to explain the continuing relevance of the Russian Orthodox 
Church.   His work is novel and difficult to compare as it is such a step away from its 
preceding scholarship; his conclusions seem well-researched and have not been 
significantly challenged.   Barring subsequent evidence to the contrary, Karpov’s 
argument is the most likely and efficient explanation for continuing affinity for the 
Russian Orthodox Church amidst late Soviet religious repression.  With this idea 
established, the remarkable events beginning in the late 1980s become far more 
understandable. 
Legacies of Perestroika in the Church 
 While the Soviet Union was deeply embroiled in the spirit of perestroika by 1988, 
the Russian Orthodox Church held its fifth sobor–the Local Council of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, a binding meeting of church hierarchs similar to the ecumenical 
councils of the Catholic Church.  New policies enacted by 1988 sobor along with the 
loosening of government control over the church led to a growing involvement of the 
Church in Russian nationalist politics.  During the Gorbachev period, a split developed 
between two major camps of Russian nationalists.  One group, broadly the conservative 
nationalists, opposed Gorbachev’s changes and sought to restore a more fundamental 
Soviet system of rule, allying themselves with a fading group of reactionary neo-
Stalinists.  On the other hand, a group of liberal nationalists emerged in a loose alliance 
with Western-style liberals—of this group the most prominent individual would be Boris 
Yeltsin, later President of the Russian Federation.  This group of liberal nationalists 
sought to separate themselves from the negatives of the Soviet legacy and cultivate a 
strong Russian sense of belonging, rather than strictly Soviet.  They were broadly pro-
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democratic, pro-free market, and resembled Western liberals in all but one major 
respect—a substantial component of their unique Russian identity was wrapped up in 
Orthodoxy.  John Dunlop explained that “the liberal nationalists are distinguished from 
Western-style liberals by their often fervent attachment to Russian Orthodoxy and to 
Russian traditions, and by their especially pronounced abhorrence of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.”13  While Dunlop erred in predicting that the liberal nationalist attraction to 
Orthodoxy as a component of Russian identity would lead to the formation of a strong 
Christian Democratic political party, he made an important point about the changing 
concerns of Russia’s leadership.  Like Gorbachev before them, the leaders of the liberal 
nationalist movement recognized the potent force which the Russian Orthodox Church 
could bring to bear for their controversial cause; in order for liberal democracy to be 
successful, a uniquely Russian identity separate from Soviet ideology needed to be 
cultivated.  Only the Russian Orthodox Church could offer the pre-Soviet continuity to 
lend credence to this formation. 
 This is not to say, though, that the relationship between the liberal nationalists and 
the church elite was a particularly strong one.  To the contrary, “Many liberal Russian 
nationalists are implacable opponents of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, whom 
they see as carriers of the bacillus of sergiyevshchina.”14  In other words, the nationalists 
saw much of the higher echelons of the Orthodox Church as being little more than an 
ecclesiastical nomenklatura, failing to truly represent a change from the Soviet regime.15  
                                                
13 John B. Dunlop, “The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism After 1988,” in Religion in Communist 
Lands (18:4, 1990), 300. 
14 Ibid., 301. 
15 NB: Nomenklatura is a term referring to the intellectual and political elite of the Soviet Union. 
Sergiyevshchina is a philosophy promulgated by Patriarch Sergi in 1927 which held that the fate of the 
USSR and the Orthodox Church were one and the same—essentially a declaration of loyalty to Soviet 
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Liberal nationalists feared the level of influence which the KGB could still exert over the 
Church and especially raised concern at the questionable election of Patriarch Alexy in 
June 1990—typical conventions of mourning for the previous patriarch and democratic 
election of his successor were not necessarily followed.  Along with Alexy’s meteoric 
rise in the church and his support from the KGB, liberal nationalists feared this meant 
that the organization had been further dominated by the security services and thus began 
to distance themselves.  
 On the other hand, the influence of the Orthodox Church on the conservative 
coalition only increased throughout this period.  As the neo-Stalinist cohort continued to 
wane in influence through a series of poor tactical maneuvers, the conservative 
nationalists with a strong affinity for Orthodoxy took on a larger role in the coalition—
eventually this group came to embrace Alexy’s Orthodox Church as the liberal 
nationalists grew more vocal in their criticism of the leadership.  Dunlop was far clearer 
about this group than about the liberal nationalists, leaving no doubt that, “most leading 
conservative Russian nationalists appear to be either Russian Orthodox believers or 
persons sympathetic to Orthodoxy as an embodiment of the Russian spirit.”16  The only 
core difference between many conservative nationalists and the Orthodox Church 
hierarchy was a rejection of world ecumenism by the nationalist cohort.  A strong 
monarchist bent among conservative nationalists lined up particularly strongly with the 
Church’s conception of symphonia with the sole exception of this dispute. 
                                                                                                                                            
leadership. This philosophy was reviled as a betrayal by Orthodox dissidents and represents one of the 
major factors in Russian Orthodox Churches attempting to break away from the Moscow Patriarchate. 
16 Ibid., 303. 
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 While liberal and conservative nationalists had extremely different aims ranging 
from a restoration of absolute monarchy to the development of a Western-style 
democracy, they were united around the conflation of Russian nationalism with Russian 
Orthodoxy.  Across the board and even as both groups had serious problems with the 
Church leadership, it was understood that Orthodoxy formed a core and inseparable part 
of Russian cultural identity.  Each group would seek to move Church leadership in its 
direction, but neither considered jettisoning the Church from their carefully cultivated 
ideologies of nationalism. 
Evolving Symphonia 
 The relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and political power which 
grew out of the perestroika reforms of the 1980s can be understood as an attempt to 
recreate symphonia in a modern political context.  As two instruments in the same 
orchestra, the Church and the state should not be discordant to each other—this principle 
drove the Church’s public support of government initiatives even as they may not directly 
follow the Church’s own preference.  Gorbachev likewise sought the legitimating power 
and influence of the Orthodox Church in order to overcome hardline communist 
opposition to his reforms.17  A new coalition was formed between the pro-perestroika 
Soviet leadership and the Orthodox Church hierarchy which granted the Church 
substantial new privileges and the restoration of great amounts of confiscated property 
including the historically significant Danilov Monastery and the Trinity Lavra of St. 
                                                
17 For a firsthand discussion of this move toward Orthodoxy, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New 
Thinking for Our Country and the World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).  For a secondary 
interpretation, consider Christopher Marsh, “Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation toward 
Church and State,” in Perspectives on Church-State Relations in Russia, ed. Daniel, Berger, and Marsh 
(Waco: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, 2008), 85-88. 
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Sergius, the so-called spiritual center of the Russian church.18  The Church was permitted 
to establish an independent governing structure and even violate state laws without 
repercussion in exchange for its support, as was seen most notably in the case of the 
Arzamas charity collection.19 
 This relationship only continued to grow as Soviet power began to decline amidst 
the emergence of regional nationalism.  Unlike the other state republics, the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was not wholly unified by a strong ethnic 
identity; it had substantial minority populations and had been created through centuries of 
imperial conquest.  Nationalist forces coopted the common tradition of Orthodoxy as a 
core value in the establishment of a definitive Russian identity.  This drove an 
increasingly close collaboration with the Orthodox Church hierarchy which has persisted 
into the present day.  The Orthodox Church was clearly the weaker partner in the church-
state relationship, but it was still able to exert dramatic influence on specific areas and 
was given wide leeway to operate insofar as it did not conflict with state aims. 
 One major subcomponent of this evolution was the reassertion of ecclesiastical 
independence on the part of autocephalous churches in the former Soviet republics.20  
                                                
18 For information on the détente between church and state leading up to the 1988 sobor see Helen Bell and 
Jane Ellis, “The Millennium Celebrations of 1988 in the USSR,” in Religion in Communist Lands (16:4, 
1988) and John B.  Dunlop, “The Russian Orthodox Church in the Millennium Year: What it Needs from 
the Soviet State,” in Religion in Communist Lands (16:2, 1988).  The Trinity-St. Sergius Lavra, also known 
as the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius or the Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius, was built in 1345 by Russia’s 
most highly-regarded saint, Sergius of Radonezh, in honor of the Holy Trinity.  Located in the city of 
Zagorsk, it served as the seat of the Patriarchate of Moscow for much of the Soviet period, until the 
Patriarch was allowed to return to Danilov Monastery in Moscow in 1983.   For more general information 
about the site, consult the Orthodox Encyclopedia. 
19 Bell and Ellis, pp. 307-312, a broad coverage of the events of the 1988 sobor, includes specific 
discussion of illegal activities undertaken by the ROC without facing state penalty such as the Arzamas 
charity collection. 
20 Autocephaly is a term that refers to national churches in Eastern Orthodoxy whose head bishops do not 
report to any higher figure. Autocephalous church structure is the organizational format of Eastern 
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Under the Soviet regime, the church structure had been consolidated around Moscow for 
organizational purposes, but this flew in the face of Orthodox tradition and theology.  As 
Soviet power collapse, groups such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church reasserted their 
independence from Moscow, leaving a smaller but more ethnically cohesive Russian 
Orthodox Church in the wake. This trend served to strengthen the corroboration between 
Orthodoxy and Russian national identity which had already begun to establish itself 
firmly in the Russian consciousness. 
Yeltsin’s Outreach to the ROC 
 President Boris Yeltsin, as was above mentioned, enjoyed a mixed relationship 
with the Orthodox Church.  Events such as the election of Patriarch Alexy in 1990 had 
served to dampen liberal nationalist enthusiasm for Orthodoxy as a component of Russian 
nationalism.  Yeltsin, feted across the West for his enlightened and liberal democratic 
ideas, did not fit in the mold of the typical Orthodox-minded politician.  He was a 
Westernizer; strong proclivities towards Orthodoxy had always been the province of the 
Slavophiles in Russia’s great directional debate.21  And yet, religion held some 
excitement for the people in the aftermath of the Soviet experiment.  “In 1990, many 
Russians saw religion in the same rosy glow in which they saw everything non-Soviet, 
from rock music to fast food to monarchism. If the Soviet Union had been against it, they 
                                                                                                                                            
Orthodoxy, with the Patriarch of Constantinople recognized as a key figure in the wider church, but only as 
“first among equals.” 
21 Two intellectual movements emerged in the 1840s in Russia, those of the Westernizers and the 
Slavophiles.  Slavophiles favored the pursuit of Russia’s own unique development, highlighting its non-
Western attributes, while Westernizers felt that Russia should seek to emulate the West in culture, civil 
society, and political structures.  Generally speaking, Slavophiles have prevailed in Russian discourse. 
 
 
14 
 
were for it—or thought it at least worth a try.”22  Russians were curious about a centuries-
old aspect of their lives that had been kept under tight reins, ready to look on the 
Orthodox Church with new eyes even if their president wasn’t overly enthusiastic. 
 The new Russian government still faced the obstacle of constructing a uniquely 
Russian national identity, though.  Through both the imperial and Soviet periods, Russia 
had been a vast multiethnic state and the Russians just one component of that, albeit an 
important one.  A post-Soviet Russian government was faced with the task not only of 
deconstructing the apparatus of Communism, but also fostering the creation of a cohesive 
new identity for its citizenry.  Ethnic Russians formed a far greater proportion of the new 
Russian Federation than they ever had of previous Russian states, but were still not an 
absolute majority and further their group identity had been de-emphasized rather than 
reinforced during the Soviet period. 
 The crystallizing moment between President Yeltsin and the Russian Orthodox 
Church came during the attempted coup of 1991.  A faction of hardline Soviets led by 
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB, arrested President Gorbachev of the USSR on 
August 18, declaring a state emergency committee was taking control of the Soviet 
government.  While he avoided arrest like Gorbachev, Yeltsin found himself barricaded 
into the House of the Soviets (the so-called Russian White House) surrounded by tanks 
and without much outward support.  When he was able to reactivate a radio broadcast, 
Yeltsin chose to make a fateful call to what may have been his only ally with any degree 
of influence in Moscow, the newly elected Patriarch Alexy: 
                                                
22 Erasmus, “Russians feel less positive towards religion now than they did in 1990,” The Economist, 31 
July 2015. 
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The tragic events that have occurred throughout the night made me turn to you, to 
reach the nation through you…Our state has been violated and along with it the 
newly emerging democracy, and freedom of choice for the electorate.  There is 
once again the shadow of disorder and chaos hanging over our country. 
At this moment of tragedy for our Fatherland I turn to you, calling on your 
authority among all religious confessions and believers.  The influence of the 
Church in our society is too great for the Church to stand aside during these 
events.  This duty is directly related to the Church’s mission, to which you have 
dedicated your life: serving people, caring for their hearts and souls.  The Church, 
which has suffered through the times of totalitarianism, may once again 
experience disorder and lawlessness. 
All believers, the Russian nation, and all Russia await your word!23 
Both a call to arms and a paean to Orthodoxy, this address puts in explicit terms several 
key observations regarding the role of the Orthodox Church in Russian life.  Yeltsin’s 
opening statement, that he hopes to reach the nation through the Patriarch, was a 
powerful recognition of the influence which the Orthodox Church could still hold over 
the population of the atheist Soviet Union.  The Patriarch remained just about the only 
free person in Moscow who could publicly speak out against the coup with any degree of 
influence. 
 Yeltsin suggested that the Church had a duty (emphasis his) to oppose the coup 
attempt, not simply that it was in the Church’s interest to oppose a return to earlier Soviet 
policies.  This assertion harkens back to the earlier relations between the Orthodox 
Church and the state in Russia.  The concordat between church and state, rooted in the 
old ideas of symphonia, involved the church supporting the legitimate state with all the 
weight it could bring to bear.  Even as the Soviet state was atheistic and antagonistic 
towards the Orthodox Church, Yeltsin still expected the Patriarchate to stand by the 
                                                
23 Boris Yeltsin, “Appeal to Patriarch Aleksy II,” in Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent, John Garrard and Carol 
Garrard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 255. 
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legitimacy of government.  The coup attempt was framed not as an assault on the 
government, but on the Russian people themselves who the Church was bound to protect.  
Despite any misgivings that the Patriarch may have had about Gorbachev’s regime 
(although these would certainly have been less than previous Patriarchs may have felt 
towards previous First Secretaries), it still represented the embodiment of the people 
more so than Kryuchkov’s conspirators. 
 The final exhortation of Yeltsin’s address would seem to lend some credence to 
Karpov’s theory of ethnodoxy.  Rather than just declaring that Orthodox believers 
awaited the Patriarch’s response, Yeltsin boldly declares that, “the Russian nation, and all 
Russia await your word!”24  A group far larger than the faithful sought the guidance of 
the Patriarch in such a trying time—Yeltsin carefully places the entire Russian nation 
under the shepherding of the Patriarch of Moscow.  This assumption ties into the 
traditional conflation of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy; the classic 
formulaic of “pravoslaviye, samoderzhaviye, narodnost’” (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, 
Nationalism) articulated by Nicholas I in 1833 still held sway after seventy years of 
Communist rule. 
 One aspect of this address worth noting is the distinction between the Russian 
nation and all Russia that Yeltsin drew.  Part of Yeltsin’s goal as President of the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was to reassert Russian nationalism and 
identification with Russia as an entity separate from the wider conglomeration of the 
Soviet Union.  Even in his attempts to counter a Soviet coup, Yeltsin would not speak 
about the Soviet people.  It is likely that Yeltsin’s reference to the Russian nation in this 
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context is referential to the historical community of ethnic Russians with their shared 
values.  Ethnic Russians who had a deep background in Orthodoxy may not believe in 
God on an individual level, but overall held a great deal of respect for the institutional 
church that represented the only body of continuity throughout their history; on every 
measured survey indicator, a large majority of the population comes out in favor of 
Orthodoxy, including a surprising, “85% of Russians [that] agreed or strongly agreed 
with the idea of inborn faithfulness (i.e., that any Russian, even if s/he is not baptized and 
does not go to church, is Orthodox in his/her heart).”25  All Russia, on the other hand, 
probably referred to the extent of Russia’s domains—an area roughly contiguous to the 
Soviet Union, but again Yeltsin would not choose to phrase it this way.  This last 
phraseology would be meant to appeal to those non-ethnic Russians who might still 
identify with Orthodoxy, such as the nascent Ukrainian Orthodox or Georgian Orthodox 
communities in the other Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs); while Yeltsin was only 
President of the RSFSR, the importance of Russia within the Soviet Union and Yeltsin’s 
presence in Moscow meant he was better equipped than most to speak to the entire Soviet 
Union. 
The Patriarch Involves Himself in Politics 
 This was a pivotal moment for the Russian Orthodox Church; Patriarch Alexy had 
the chance to re-engage with the Russian population at a time of trial and make a 
significant choice that would impact the future of the state. At first he moved rather 
subtly. Shortly after Yeltsin’s address, Alexy was presiding over a liturgy at the 
Cathedral of the Assumption inside the Kremlin. John and Carol Garrard recount that, 
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“instead of remembering the ‘authorities’ and ‘the army’ as was customary, he prayed 
‘for our country protected by God and its people.’”26  Long a backer of the Russian (and 
Soviet) armed forces and state authority, here the Patriarch took a seemingly semantic but 
significant stance against the institutional forces lining up to overcome the people’s will.  
In particular, the Patriarch’s omission of the Army from his blessing on a significant feast 
day liturgy would have given several in the military pause.  This formulation was quickly 
followed by a fax sent around the world, in which the Patriarch demanded that the people 
should hear from Gorbachev himself and declared that, 
We call upon all parts of the Russian Orthodox Church, the whole of our people, 
and particularly our army at this critical moment for our nation to show support 
and not to permit the shedding of fraternal blood.  We raise the heartfelt prayer to 
our Lord and summon all true believers in our Church to join this prayer begging 
Him to dispense peace to the peoples of our land so that they can in future build 
their homeland in accordance with freedom of choice and the accepted norms of 
morality and law. 
Aleksy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 20th August 1991 Moscow27 
This more explicit reference to the army and its duty amidst this crisis demonstrates the 
ultimate concern that the Patriarch had was to prevent an outbreak of violent bloodshed.  
Prior to Alexy’s fax, word had gone out that 10 tanks and associated soldiers had gone 
over to Yeltsin’s side and were defending the White House.  The first concern that he 
sought to address, thus, was the prevention of immediate Russian bloodshed.  This tactic 
seems to have been effective; when the junta tried to order the army to move against 
Yeltsin, the orders were refused—Soviet officers would not fight their own compatriots. 
                                                
26 John Garrard and Carol Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 18. 
27 Aleksy II, “Announcement of the Moscow Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksy II,” in 
Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent, John and Carol Garrard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 256. 
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 More broadly, Patriarch Alexy spoke to “the whole of our people,” in this 
announcement.  Like Yeltsin’s reference to the Russian nation in his own earlier address, 
the Patriarch is calling out to a group that is perceived as unified by the common bonds of 
Orthodoxy: the people of Russia.  While the Patriarch does speak to “all true believers in 
our Church” a couple of sentences later, his first specific reference to an audience 
remains the whole Russian people.  Yeltsin and Patriarch Alexy here share the same goal 
of fostering a unity among the Russian people that was thoroughly de-emphasized during 
the Soviet period.  By choosing to stand with Yeltsin’s Russia, Patriarch Alexy is aiming 
to rebuild the close linkage between the state and the church which typified pre-Soviet 
Russia. At the same time, he called for President Gorbachev to address the nation on the 
state of affairs—Alexy was not willing to explicitly stand for Yeltsin himself, but instead 
pushed for the legitimate voice of Soviet governance to speak. 
 A minor but significant aspect of this announcement is the title by which the 
Patriarch chooses to refer to himself.  The pronouncement is signed, “Aleksy II, Patriarch 
of Moscow and All Russia,” the traditional title of the Patriarch of Moscow.  This was 
not, however, the title he was accorded or recognized with by the Soviet government.  As 
part of the Church’s deal with Stalin around the onset of World War II, the title of the 
Patriarch had been revised to “Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’” because Russia was no 
longer a significant legal entity.  Rus’ had a nice historic sound to it and allowed the 
Patriarch’s jurisdiction to extend throughout the various SSRs, while also de-emphasizing 
the exclusionary Russian nature of Moscow’s Patriarchate in line with ostensible Soviet 
goals of erasing ethnic divisions within the USSR.  Just as Yeltsin chose to refer to the 
Russian nation and all Russia, rather than the Soviet Union, when he exhorted Alexy to 
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take a stand on the coup, Alexy chose to fall back on his own historic title which referred 
specifically to the state of Russia.  Both the President of the yet-to-exist sovereign state 
and the Patriarch of its historic church used this opportunity to re-assert the identification 
of the people with their “Russian-ness.”  The two parties both recognized and sought to 
take advantage of the position of the Church to build up a strong new Russian identity in 
opposition to the revanchist Soviet forces under Khryuchkov. 
 This particular address was also a very savvy political piece.  On its most basic 
level, this document challenged the legitimacy of the coup which had taken place.  Before 
getting to any of his exhortations to the people or the armed forces, the Patriarch zoned in 
on the controversy surrounding Gorbachev’s retirement.  His address began with the 
observation that, “this situation is troubling the consciences of millions of our fellow 
citizens, who are concerned about the legality of the newly formed State Emergency 
Committee which has declared that it has taken supreme power in the USSR.”28  This was 
followed quickly by a demand to hear from President Gorbachev himself his own views 
on these circumstances.  The address thus served as a call to restore law and stability in 
society like Yeltsin’s initial address, but it also reached out to Gorbachev rather than 
Yeltsin himself.  Before ever appealing to the people, the Patriarch specifically reached 
out to the legitimate governing institutions.  Along with this, it is worth noting that he 
directed his appeal to the government and not the party institutions; “we hope that the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR will give careful consideration to what has taken place and 
will take decisive measures to bring about the stabilization of the situation in the 
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country.”29  The Patriarch specifically did not ask the top party apparatus for action, but 
the top governing body.  Perhaps a bit like Alexy’s title, this telling tidbit suggests that 
any allegiance that the Church may have developed to the Soviet leadership was to the 
governing institutions themselves, not the Communist Party which occupied them.  A 
traditionally conservative force in society, the Church would back the legitimate 
governing organs even when it did not like the policy of those holding office. 
 The August 20 fax was not the full extent of the Church’s weight mustered 
against the coup attempt.  Less than 24 hours after this announcement had been released, 
fighting broke out and two young men were shot while another was trampled under a 
tank outside the Russian White House.  Angry crowds swarmed and military vehicles 
were set on fire in protest.  The Patriarch learned of these events almost immediately and 
took an unheard-of step for Church officials in the Soviet period: he got on the radio and 
made a live public address.  This powerful statement appealed to the people to let their 
better sides shine through, an approach that was, “more personal and more magisterial,” 
in John and Carol Garrard’s words.30  The Patriarch attempted to unify the long 
institutional power that his office held with a connection to the Russian past and previous 
struggles.  To this end, Alexy opened his address with “Brothers and Sisters,” the same 
formulation that Joseph Stalin used in his wartime radio addresses after the Germans 
invaded the Soviet Union.  Stalin had called on his brothers and sisters to stand up and 
repel invaders; Alexy now called on these same brothers and sisters to prevent the 
outbreak of civil war.31  This address represented the first time that the Patriarch of 
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Moscow had spoken unfiltered to the whole of his people at least since the Russian 
Revolution, if not the first time in history: 
Brothers and Sisters! The delicate civil peace of our society has been rent asunder.  
According to the latest information, open armed conflict and loss of life have 
begun. In these circumstances, my duty as Patriarch is to warn everybody for 
whom the word of the church is dear and carries weight: Every person who raises 
arms against his neighbor, against unarmed civilians, will be taking upon his soul 
a very profound sin which will separate him from the Church and from God.  It is 
appropriate to shed more tears and say more prayers for such people than for their 
victims. 
May God protect you from the terrible sin of fratricide.  I solemnly warn all my 
fellow-citizens: 
The Church does not condone and cannot condone unlawful and violent acts and 
the shedding of blood. 
I ask all of you, my dear ones, to do everything possible to prevent the flame of 
civil war from bursting forth. 
Cease at once! 
I ask soldiers and their officers to remember that no one can set a prince on 
human life and pay it. 
I ask the Most Holy Mother of God, the Protector of our city, at this time of the 
Feast of the Transfiguration, not to withdraw Her protection from us, but to 
preserve all of us. 
O Mother of God, help us to reconcile ourselves to one another, to the truth, and 
to God! 
Aleksy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia32 
While couched in liturgical language, Alexy’s address was at heart an appeal to morals 
and to shared Russian identity.  References to the Mother of God as a protector of 
Moscow date back almost as far as the city of Moscow itself, and go even further to when 
the city of Constantinople asserted the same protection.  One of the most famous images 
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from surviving sources on the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 is the Patriarch in full 
regalia processing along the city’s bombarded walls with an icon of the Virgin Mary 
believed to have been painted by St. Luke himself.  The same practice had been 
employed in previous Russian conflicts; both Dmitry Donskoi and Alexander Nevsky’s 
legends are often linked to the intervention of the Theotokos.33  It is no surprise, then, 
that, “these references to Mary as the “Protector of our city” tapped the deepest memory 
of the Russian people.”34 
 The reference to Theotokos quickly had its desired effect.  The closing appeal of 
Alexy’s speech was not really unique, it was a truncated form of, “the famous troparion 
written to the Kazan Icon of the Theotokos credited with saving the city in the early 
seventeenth century.”35  This would have been one of the most familiar prayers to 
Russian Orthodox believers and a classic point to turn in troubled times.  The very same 
words had been employed during the Polish invasion of 1612, then again in the Swedish 
invasion of 1709, and a third time at Napoleon’s 1812 invasion.  Reaction among the 
gathered crowd at the House of the Soviets was swift; “upon hearing Mater Bozhia, the 
Russian Orthodox believers in the crowd began crossing themselves and bowing, thus 
completing with their bodies a direct and dynamic relationship between the patriarch and 
his flock.”36  The people confirmed that Alexy’s words still held sway, a fact that was not 
at all clear prior to the August coup. 
                                                
33 Theotokos, a Greek phrase, is the Orthodox title for Mary.  In the West, the phrase Mother of God (Mater 
Dei) is frequently used, but this is not a good translation of the phrase, as the Western usage has a different 
connotation than the Eastern.  A more accurate Latin translation might be Deipara (God-bearer, Birth-
Giver of God).   
34 Garrard and Garrard, 24. 
35 Ibid., 26. 
36 Ibid., 26. 
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On a personal level to Alexy, this is the same imagery that Patriarch Alexy I 
employed during the German invasion in 1941; the closest equivalent to Alexy’s August 
21 radio address in Soviet history was when Stalin allowed Metropolitan Alexy of 
Leningrad and Novgorod to make a speech from Moscow’s Bogoyavlensky (Epiphany) 
Cathedral.  Alexy had chosen his regnal name in no small part because of Alexy I’s 
actions in 1941, a moment when Russia’s fate stood in the balance and the church stood 
up to rally the people.  Even Stalin recognized the profound capacity of the Orthodox 
Church to inspire Russians, so, “on August 10, 1941, the Red Army was retreating on all 
fronts, and German Panzers were racing towards Moscow.  Desperate to rally the people, 
Stalin turned not to the party but to the ROC.”37  While not broadcast across the nation by 
radio and while not yet the Patriarch, Alexy I’s inspirational speech dove deep into the 
trove of Russian historical memory, citing Kutuzov, Nevsky, Donskoi and St. Sergius of 
Radonezh among others.  It also involved appeals to Theotokos, just as Alexy II would 
employ fifty years later.  There is little doubt that the Patriarch recognized the striking 
similarities between August 1941 and August 1991 as he chose to make this address: it 
was in times of severest crisis that the Church could break through Soviet barriers and 
make a public stand with the people. 
Patriarch Alexy assumed great personal risk in making this speech.  Beyond the 
question of ramifications for the Church breaking rules that had been laid out regarding 
its conduct, he was making a very public appeal to the Theotokos for relief. Within the 
Russian Orthodox Church, whether one’s prayer is answered or not is treated as a 
reflection on whether a person is sufficiently faithful.  Were bloodshed to proceed 
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further, the Patriarch would have undermined his own faithfulness in the eyes of the 
people, of the Church, and of the government.  Had the coup succeeded, it is almost 
certain that Alexy would have been removed from power and met an ignominious end.  
Even were the coup to be defeated, he may still have struggled if it came at the cost of the 
serious internecine bloodshed that he fervently prayed against.  This ultimately did not 
come to pass and indeed, the Patriarch’s reputation among Russians was only enhanced 
by his timely intervention here, but that he was willing to assume this risk to make such a 
statement is telling. 
The Public Reaction and Re-Emergence of Religiosity 
The impact of this speech was immediate, and for good reason.  Garrard and 
Garrard point out that the KGB’s favorite time to initiate action was 2 A.M. due to a 
natural lethargy in the body’s circadian rhythm.  Patriarch Alexy was aware of this 
because a similar situation had unfolded in Lithuania around 6 months prior, in which the 
KGB sent troops in at 2 A.M. over the Patriarch’s objection.  This time, there was no 2 
A.M. assault; after hearing the Patriarch’s address, members of the army outside the 
House of the Soviets became unwilling to move in, especially not through the crowd of 
people that was forming in support of Yeltsin.  In a stunning public display of religiosity, 
priests went up to the soldiers around the tanks and offered them bibles.  Noted Russia 
scholar and former Librarian of Congress James Billington recalled this scene vividly, 
considering, “particularly remarkable…the distribution of 2,000 New Testaments to the 
young would-be attackers and another 2,000 to the defenders of the White House by the 
found of the Russian Bible Society, Father Alexander Borisov.  Such actions blurred the 
distinction between the opposing groups and suggested that there might be something 
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deeper to which both sides might rally.”38  Religion was a unifying force among Russian 
people, the distribution of bibles symbolic of a profound connection that no government 
orders could overcome. 
The crowd around the White House quickly grew after Alexy’s moonlight appeal 
for calm; primarily young and male before the Patriarch’s involvement, a much wider 
subsection of the population quickly filtered onto the Krasnopresnenskaya embankment.  
Billington was in a meeting with elderly female librarians when the speech began, and 
remembered that, “spontaneously and without discussion, they all left to join the young 
men on the barricades and other elderly women who had been rebuking soldiers in the 
tanks.”39  Long discounted by both the Soviet government and Western observers as an 
irrelevant, outdated group, these women who had attended church for their entire lives 
despite harassment and oppression created even greater tension on the military members 
in the square.  They were no longer being asked to oppose simple political dissidents—
other young men and politicians—but their mothers and grandmothers, and in Russia one 
does not trifle with one’s babushka.  Yeltsin had galvanized the nascent political 
opposition around himself, but the Patriarch was able to galvanize society as a whole. 
A far larger crowd developed away from the White House, however, and made 
their way to Lubyanka Square, the headquarters of the KGB.  Here, the famous statue of 
Felix Dzerzhinsky, the father of the Soviet Union’s secret police, was pulled down live 
on CNN around the world.  Garrard and Garrard report, however, that after the news 
broadcast cut away, believers who had heard Patriarch Alexy’s prayer had erected an 
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Orthodox cross in its place and painted the phrase, “sim pobedishi,” on its plinth.40  This 
phrase is no doubt more familiar to the Western reader in Latin than in Old Church 
Slavonic, in hoc signo vinces.  Even as the security services removed the cross, the 
Emperor Constantine’s vision remained on Dzerzhinsky’s former mount.  There is some 
poetic simile here; Constantine was the emperor who finally triumphed over paganism, 
brought his people to Christianity, and founded the city of Constantinople which would 
become the epicenter of Orthodoxy.  Just as Constantine conquered the forces of 
godlessness at the Milvian Bridge in A.D. 312, Russian Orthodox believers were 
overthrowing the forces of institutionalized atheism and repression in 1991. 
The Creation of Church Power in the Late Soviet Period 
The massive and unexpected popular reaction to the Patriarch’s call to arms 
reveals that in 1991, the Church held far more power in Russia than most analysts 
realized.  Even with comprehensive access to media outlets and government propaganda 
officials, neither Yeltsin nor Kryuchkov could generate the level of support that Alexy 
managed with one short radio broadcast.  Since the Church spotted a thaw in the 
government stance towards religion in the early 1980s, its elite had worked tirelessly to 
build a quiet body of support and reassert influence where possible.  This was abetted by 
the Soviet desire to utilize the Church as a propaganda tool for Western audiences; the 
body was allowed to develop sufficient autonomy that it was able to build up a base of 
influence that such a shrewd operator as Patriarch Alexy was easily able to employ when 
the opportunity presented itself. 
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The response to the 1991 coup attempt is thus best understood as the first 
manifestation of a carefully generated, reinvigorated Church presence in the twilight of 
the Soviet Union.  The Patriarchate had played upon its historic role in society and 
connections to redevelop itself, building important relationships that would come through 
when conflict erupted.  As suggested earlier in this paper, one of the most significant 
relationships that was rebuilt was that between the Orthodox Church and the Red Army.  
Like in many other societies throughout history, the members of the Soviet armed forces 
had the firm support of their church and a long-standing relationship.  This has 
manifested more recently in such odd events as the blessing of tanks by Orthodox priests 
before they departed for Georgia in the 2008 South Ossetian conflict.  Some form of 
relationship between the Red Army and the Orthodox Church had first been firmly 
developed during World War II under Patriarch Alexy I.  This relationship had only been 
built upon in the 1980s, so that when Alexy II chose to interject himself in politics, he, 
“had been cultivating wingless allies with boots on the ground: the generals of the Red 
Army.”41 
The tactic paid off quickly.  Alexander Rutskoy, the Vice President of the RSFSR 
and a major Afghanistan war hero, spoke out backing the Patriarch after his fax had been 
sent; this man carried a great deal of weight with the military crowd, his backing would 
have been consequential in the eyes of many Red Army officers.  Even before Alexy had 
publicly spoken out against the coup attempt, the KGB’s Alpha Unit had refused to carry 
out an order to storm the White House.  Garrard and Garrard link this refusal to a 
situation in Vilnius around six months prior, one in which there were many casualties and 
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the Patriarch excoriated the Red Army and the government for such inappropriate action.  
At the time, Alexy spoke directly to the soldiers who carried out the raid about sin and a 
parable of John the Baptist.  This apparently so affected the members of the Alpha Unit, 
supposedly the KGB’s most ruthless men, to such an extent that they were willing to 
refuse orders from the Communist Party.  The result of the coup, then, was that, “the 
alliance between the patriarchate and the military that had existed in the catacombs was 
just beginning to surface into public view.”42  Having built up close connections with the 
military elite, Patriarch Alexy was able to rely on their support to prevent further 
bloodshed as the situation deteriorated. 
Church power had been carefully cultivated below the surface during the 1980s 
through the fostering of new relationships with society’s power brokers and an effective 
model of operation that did not outwardly challenge the Soviet system.  This left the 
church in a strong position to exert influence when the system started to crack under its 
own pressures.  Writing shortly after this time period, Billington suggests that, 
Russians today are living through what they call a ‘time of troubles,’ when one 
form of legitimacy has been rejected, but no new form has yet been fully 
accepted.  In such a time, Russian Christianity brings with it the special authority 
of having survived its targeted extinction under the Soviet system—and having 
provided a previously flagging faith with what Russians call the “new martyrs,” 
perhaps the greatest number of Christians persecuted or killed for their faith in 
modern times.43 
By the late 1980s, the Soviet experiment had in many ways lost its legitimacy.  A 
moribund economy, political repression at home, and a series of foreign policy blunders 
abroad had eviscerated trust in government.  At the same time, there was no credible 
opposition with a claim to real legitimacy; this is essentially what Yeltsin, Rutskoy, and 
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their compatriots were attempting to create out of the events of August 1991.  As 
Billington ably recognized, this left the church as the only body with the organizational 
stability, respect, and legitimacy necessary to command the hearts and minds of the 
people.  There was no continuity to pre-revolutionary Russia outside of the Orthodox 
Church by this time period; no other organization had survived in anything approaching 
its original form.44  Further, the so-called martyrdom of believers at the hands of a now-
distrusted Soviet government added to the prestige of the church in popular eyes.  
Through political savvy and a keen understanding of history, Patriarch Alexy led his 
church to a real position of power in society able to seriously influence the outcome of 
events as the Soviet Union fell apart. 
Religious Freedom and the New Russian State 
 This did not mean, however, that Orthodoxy would rise to an immediate position 
of power in the emerging Russian Federation.  The level of optimism that accompanied 
the fall of Communism in Western circles cannot be overstated.  Observers presumed that 
the new Russia would adopt European democratic norms and integrate into the “common 
European home” which Gorbachev had made a centerpiece of his détente initiatives—not 
revert back to the pre-1917 status quo of superficial symphonia.  President Yeltsin was 
feted the world over and talked the talk on the development of a strong democratic 
society in Russia, including in the realm of religious freedom.  Less outwardly concerned 
with the Orthodox Church which had helped secure his success in the 1991 struggle for 
power, Yeltsin became a staunch defender of religious freedom and pluralism against a 
                                                
44 The nearest approximation would be the Academy of Sciences, which had a history dating back to 1724.  
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backdrop of increasing calls to restrict minority religious groups.  For several years, he 
resisted efforts by the legislature and the Orthodox Church to adopt more explicitly pro-
Orthodox government policies. 
 The influx of new religious missionary movements in the post-Soviet space was 
swift and unrelenting.  Gorbachev’s 1990 law on religious freedom had opened the door 
for religious activism irrespective of one’s citizenship and independent of government 
oversight, so foreign missionaries flooded into the country seeking converts.  Among the 
most numerous groups arriving in Russia at this time were Western Protestants.  Of the 
more mainstream denominations, Lutherans and Baptists attempted to gain a foothold in 
Russia amidst the religious revival of the first years after communism’s collapse.  Other 
groups such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Salvation Army also made 
appearances in cities and small towns across Russia.  This was not, however, without 
controversy.  The Orthodox Church viewed such action as an affront; Russian Orthodoxy 
had been an active participant in international ecumenical movements throughout the 
Soviet period and knew that other denominations recognized its ancient form of 
Christianity.45  The ingress of religious groups from other non-Russian denominations 
was interpreted as a slap in the face, their target converts an already-Christian group of 
people who fell within the Moscow Patriarchate’s natural influence.  It should come as no 
surprise, then, that efforts to restrict the liberal 1990 legislation would rapidly emerge.46 
                                                
45 Since World War II, the Russian Orthodox Church had actively participated in all world church 
movements such as the World Council of Churches at the behest of the Soviet government, which hoped to 
use its presence there to sell the illusion of religious freedom within the Soviet Union toWestern audiences.  
46 For more information on the situation for non-Orthodox religious groups, see Fagan chap. 3, Rites of 
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 The first major attempt to curtail religious liberty and grant additional privileges 
to the Russian Orthodox Church came in August 1993, only about a month before the 
constitutional crisis that would lead to the reconstitution of the legislative bodies and 
Yeltsin’s consolidation of power.  The Supreme Soviet attempted to amend Russia’s 
landmark 1990 law “On Freedom of Worship,” an exceptionally liberal document 
protecting freedom of conscience and practice of religion.  These amendments would 
have strictly curtailed religious liberty for the new foreign-based faith groups that had 
entered Russia since the loosening of Soviet restrictions.  Yeltsin’s official response 
condemned the effort, stating that the proposed changes would contradict, “equal rights 
of individuals to enjoy freedom of conscience and religion in the territory of Russia, 
regardless of their possession of Russian citizenship.”47  The President thus emerged as a 
defender of both the Constitution and newfound rights in Russia, a position which placed 
him at least partially against an Orthodox Church body which was interested in regaining 
its historic privileges from the Russian state. 
 The Orthodox Church was concerned by the fact that new Christian groups such 
as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Lutherans were coming into Russia in increasing 
numbers and attempting to convert people that the church saw as part of its own body 
faithful.  Proposed changes were thus rooted in a desire to protect the Orthodox from 
being overcome by better-resourced foreign pressure.  After Yeltsin came out of the 1993 
power struggle with his position consolidated, it seemed that this aim was doomed for 
defeat, but instead the rejection of the law was followed by, “four years of intense 
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pressure brought by the Orthodox Church and by nationalist groups protesting the 
activities of outside missionary organizations and newly emergent indigenous religious 
groups.”48  The bulk of this skepticism was directed at Protestant movements with little 
history in Russia, but it is worth noting that the Roman Catholic Church also faced 
Orthodox opposition to its attempts to re-enter the Russian sphere.  Even this 
organization which itself had a lengthy history in parts of the Russian Empire was 
targeted to the extent that Pope John Paul II was prevented from ever attaining a Russian 
visa and visiting the country after decades of attempts. 
Fear of losing their influence in society if multi-confessionalism became the norm 
in Russia kept the church invested in the question of amendment to the landmark 1990 
law.  After the floodgates of missionary activity had opened in 1991, an Orthodox priest 
decried the situation, lamenting that, “Moscow isn’t a Babylon for secondary cults, for 
Protestant congregations who resemble wild wolves rushing in here or Catholics like 
thieves using their billions to try to occupy new territory.”49  In the church’s view, Russia 
had its own longstanding faith tradition which had deserved preeminence in the new post-
Soviet space.  Patriarch Alexy publicly expressed his conviction that, “unless the 
government affirmed Russia’s traditional faiths against the aggressive actions of other 
religious groups and sects…the renewal of Russia’s own spiritual traditions stood little 
chance.”50  This position did manage to attract a fair degree of support amongst both 
legislators and the wider population.  Derek H. Davis suggests that this is because the 
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1990 law, “was perhaps an idealized vision of what Russia might be in theory, but 
nevertheless an overestimate of what Russia was prepared to be in practice.”51  As the 
novelty of religious freedom wore off and actively proselytizing groups such as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses grew to be the face of foreign religious movements, the popularity 
of measures restricting their freedom of movement seemed to rise. 
 Even as he developed a closer relationship with the Orthodox Church in other 
areas around the 1996 election, President Yeltsin remained firm on his opposition to 
watering down the idealistic 1990 religious freedom law.  When the first draft of the 
proposed 1997 law ultimately reached his desk on July 23, he responded to the President 
of the State Duma and President of the Federation Council that the law, “contradicts the 
basic foundation of the constitutional structure of the Russian Federation, and generally 
recognized principles and norms of international law.”52  This opposition was taken 
further in his scheduled national radio address two days later.  Yeltsin appealed to the 
Russian people in defense of his stand, recognizing that, “Russia needs such a law 
badly…to defend our people’s moral and spiritual health, to erect reliable barriers in the 
way of radical sects that have already dealt enough harm, crippling the spiritual health of 
many of our citizens, young people, first and foremost,” but also reasserting that, “a 
democratic state cannot infringe on minorities’ interests (no matter what seemingly noble 
interests might dictate such a move).”53  The incorporation of both a very real concern for 
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the spiritual health of the people in Russia (and an implicit linkage of that health with 
Orthodoxy) and a concern for democratic norms and basic rights highlights the long-
running dichotomy in Russian politics between considering themselves European and 
considering themselves unique.   
The struggle over the place of religious freedom in the new Russia was simply 
one more reckoning of the age-old Slavophile versus Westernizer debate; the Orthodox 
Church had never gotten along well with Westernizers and the Slavophile position 
usually tended to win in the end.  At the same time, these categories are 
oversimplifications of the deep mixed loyalties inherent in Russian-ness.  Yeltsin has 
always been considered a Westernizer, but his actions here reveal an acute awareness of 
and respect for the historical position of Orthodoxy in Russian society, the fundamental 
non-European-ness that Russia has never been able to break away from.  Patriarch Alexy, 
on the other hand, represented the classic Slavophile, fearing that outside influence would 
dilute the unique traditions of Russian faith, but still favoring a policy of ecumenism in 
the church’s relations with the wider Christian community.  In short, Alexy hoped to 
maintain positive relations with world Christianity and win Russian Orthodoxy a seat at 
the table in any future discussions, but this did not extend to allowing world Christianity 
into Russia.  In the end, Yeltsin was himself in the minority on this issue and ultimately 
caved, signing a law that he had vetoed three times prior in the past four years without 
any real changes having been made.  This is not on its face surprising.  Geraldine Fagan 
of Forum 18, a religious freedom NGO, suggests that, “Russian national identity is 
classically regarded as inseparable from mainline Orthodox Christianity…to both its 
 
 
36 
 
supporters and sceptics, religious freedom is therefore alien to Russian culture.”54  
Yeltsin was fighting to defend a value that many would argue his countrymen simply do 
not share.  While this author would consider such a claim an overstatement, it is certainly 
not an unusual point of view. 
Regional bodies had not universally accepted the 1990 law, providing a template 
for the opposition to Yeltsin which emerged between 1993 and 1997.  Certain groups, 
especially Hare Krishnas, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses attracted much attention 
outside of Moscow, where, “early on regional courts began trespassing over the law by 
restricting religious liberty to those groups they found distasteful…local and regional 
courts had few qualms about violating these legally-guaranteed liberties when they were 
seen as causing harm to Russia’s cultural environment.”55  Specifically targeted groups 
often found their freedom to operate severely restricted beyond the terms of what the 
1990 law would permit, but often did not get sufficient relief from legal avenues.  This 
regional action provided an important reference point for advocates in favor of harsher 
national restrictions on religious freedom and was an example that could be cited to 
demonstrate how such policies could work in practice.  As support for more restrictive 
measures grew at a national level, “the new legislation took its cue from the regional 
religious laws by introducing discrimination between associations according to their 
degree of establishment within Russia.”56  This precedent guided the creation of the 1997 
legislation that President Yeltsin would ultimately commit to sign. 
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Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations 
The law that was ultimately passed in 1997 contained several articles that 
demarcated three types by which a religious body could be categorized: religious 
organizations, religious associations, and religious groups.  Religious groups are the 
simplest of the three categories, referring to an informal meeting without legal status such 
as a bible study among friends.  The two other categories, however, are the instrument by 
which the state aimed to curtail the privileges of new foreign-based religious 
organizations while recognizing pride of place and privilege for the Russian Orthodox 
Church.  This law continued to pay lip service to ideals of religious freedom; “the 1997 
law again declares that Russia is a secular state, but it gives a privileged place to 
Orthodoxy as coterminous with the state from its very beginnings.”57  In this manner the 
state could claim that it was endeavoring to protect the rights that had come to be 
expected after 1991, but also clamp down on those foreign organizations which both the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the state deemed deleterious to stability. 
It is worth noting that this law only targeted these foreign religious groups, not the 
other longstanding minority faith groups in Russia.  The aim was not to restrict religious 
freedom of the people, per se, but to restrict the freedom of action of foreign groups; “this 
was tolerance Russian-style: the ‘traditional’ faiths of Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism 
were to be allowed to ‘own property, to have radio and television stations, and to 
disseminate religious literature.’ They would be exempt from taxes and able to conduct 
services…”58  These groups had a history in Russia dating back centuries, not so far as 
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the Russian Orthodox Church but long enough that they could be safely considered 
established.  Further, they were accustomed to the parameters of working within the 
Russian state.  Groups which received the category of “religious association” would not 
enjoy such privileges, although they had the opportunity over time to progress into 
greater rights.  Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism did not seem to represent the same threat to 
Orthodoxy’s cultural dominance that Western Christian sects seemed to in the early 
1990s. 
The clear targeting of non-Orthodox Christian groups with this legislation 
becomes even more evident when one approaches the manner in which Orthodoxy itself 
is referenced within the statute.  Geraldine Fagan observes that, “while it did not have 
legal force, the law’s preamble set the relevant tone.  It recognized Orthodox 
Christianity’s ‘special role’ in Russia’s history, spirituality and culture…”59  This 
interpretation was heavily supported by the Orthodox Church, which had developed an 
increasingly negative view of its Western brethren beyond their longstanding theological 
differences.  Orthodoxy was not made a state religion in any official context, but the law, 
“codified the idea that being Christian and being Orthodox are one and the same thing.”60  
Special privileges were carved out for the Russian Orthodox Church, including the 
distinction of being the only religious organization to be granted government financing 
for, “the restoration, maintenance, and protection of buildings and objects which are 
monuments of history and culture.”61  Unique material benefits such as these were 
considered by many observers as tantamount to state establishment, although the law 
                                                
59 Fagan, 66-67. 
60 Garrard and Garrard, 173. 
61 John Witte, “Introduction,” in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, ed. John 
Witte and Michael Bordeaux (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), 14. 
 
 
39 
 
took great pains to not explicitly do so.  The Russian perspective was different, one 
rooted in the thousand-year comingled history of the Orthodox faith and the Russian 
state.  From this perspective, “the law explicitly identified Orthodox Christianity with 
Russia’s national memory and heritage, which had to be recovered and strengthened, and 
the church as an institution stood at the center of these efforts.”62  As an effort began to 
reconstruct a Russian identity separate from the Soviet experience, the Orthodox Church 
was an important partner and a powerful legitimating force; the continued surging 
presence of non-Orthodox Christian movements would only dilute its effectiveness at this 
task. 
The 1997 religious freedom law was at the same time backward and forward 
looking.  The state was aligning itself with Orthodoxy to look back on an era of greater 
stability and cooperation; Daniel and Marsh argue that, “in its conception, the 1997 law 
reverted to a ‘traditional’ relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Russian 
state, a symphonic relationship, in which the church and state worked together 
harmoniously to manage worldly affairs and prepare inhabitants for entrance into the 
world to come.”63  These terms should sound familiar, as symphonia was the relationship 
which the Orthodox Church had idealized throughout this period.  While the situation 
was not so simple (Russian history has always been replete with examples of the state 
bucking the church and this certainly has not changed since 1991), this is the framework 
in which the 1997 law approached the Russian world.  Russia had grown increasingly 
unstable in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and was searching for a 
new base to situate itself.  Billington suggests that the driving factor for state action in 
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this time period was, “the search for authority….as newly freed peoples search for unique 
identities in a world of creeping technological uniformity and for a source of 
responsibility amid the fluidity of freedom, they are rediscovering their own deeper 
cultural traditions.”64  The state was seeking to create conditions for stable growth in 
Russia, and the best way to foster such was to look back to Russia’s traditional roots of 
stability—its Orthodox heritage and a closely-guarded relationship between the 
institutional church and the state. 
One major effect of this legislation that applied across the board of faith traditions 
was the reassertion of government oversight of the ecclesiastical sphere.  In the 
intervening period from 1990 to 1997, there had been shockingly little government 
involvement in religious organizations’ affairs.  In sharp contrast to this attitude, “the 
1997 law imported a second key concept from the regional religious laws: the restoration 
of close regulation of religious life.  Gone was the 1990 law’s provision forbidding the 
creation of government organs or posts devoted to freedom of conscience issues…”65  A 
more Soviet-style system was created wherein religious groups had to register with the 
state, providing large amounts of information about their activities, membership, and 
finances in exchange for categorization and approval.  State bureaucrats could reject 
registration applications, and religious groups which failed to register could face 
liquidation under article 14 of the new law.  The Orthodox Church was never at risk of 
failing to meet the requirements of the law—it was, after all, tailor-written to the 
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Orthodox situation, but it still faced a greater amount of scrutiny than it had for the past 
several years. 
The 1997 law, then, can be framed as an Orthodox victory over multiconfessional 
forces.  Strict new requirements and potential for government oversight would limit the 
extent to which oppositional Christian movements could emerge, at least for fifteen or so 
years, the term of time for which an organization was required to be active in Russia to 
qualify for enrollment as a “religious organization.”  Further, organizations had to be able 
to document an over 50-year history of activity in Russia to use the word “Russian” in 
their name—an incredible requirement considering the wide use of the term by 
multinational corportations such as Nestle marketing inside the Russian Federation and 
one which functionally restricted this term to the Orthodox Church.66  Many political 
scientists concluded that, “passage of the 1997 law On Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Associations signaled the usurpation of Russia’s newly enshrined pluralism by 
the old Orthodox-centred model of Russian national identity.”67  The state had recognized 
both the value of Orthodoxy as a political tool and the inherent danger in permitting the 
continued growth of foreign religious forces to a goal of maintaining stability, controlling 
the population, and fostering a greater national identity.  The 1997 law has laid the 
framework for most church-state interactions in Russia since its passage, including the 
growing collaboration between Russian Orthodox Church and government organs.  In the 
time since, Orthodoxy has come to more profoundly influence both the domestic and the 
foreign policy of the Russian government. 
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The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy Post-1997 
 Since the passage of the 1997 law setting up a framework for church-state 
relations, the Orthodox Church has become closely involved in the foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation.  The goals of the church to re-establish its connections with the 
Russian Orthodox diaspora which had split off as the Russian Orthodox Church Outside 
of Russia (ROCOR) during the Soviet period and reclaim its lost property overseas 
meshed well with the new government’s desire to reassert itself throughout the so-called 
russkiy mir (Russian world) and rebuild Russia’s international prestige.  Like the Soviet 
government following World War II, the Yeltsin and Putin administrations would co-opt 
the Orthodox Church to extend their foreign policy vision around the globe.  The 
Orthodox Church would benefit from this to the extent that its relations with other 
Orthodox and the wider Christian communities would improve along with its influence 
on world ecumenical affairs.  Ecumenical reconciliation has led to a widening of the 
Moscow Patriarchate’s flock, a rise in its pre-eminence at international gatherings, a 
restoration of church property outside Russia. 
 Looking back on the period of the late Yeltsin and early Putin administrations, an 
increasingly close collaboration between the organized church and the Russian Foreign 
Ministry emerged.  Daniel Payne, a senior research fellow at the J.M. Dawson Institute of 
Church-State Studies at Baylor University, notes that,  
During the reign of Alexey II, especially during the Putin administration, the 
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) expanded its role, uniting its mission with that 
of the RFM to secure the rights or ‘spiritual security’ of the Russian diaspora as 
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well as to reacquire property that had formerly belonged to the Russian Empire 
and had been lost during the Communist period.68 
The prestige of both the Orthodox Church and the Russian government has been raised 
around the world as a result of this collaboration.  The utilization of Orthodoxy as a 
component of nationalist foreign policy harkens back to the equivalence of Russian 
identity and Orthodoxy that has already been addressed in this paper.  In effect, “the 
church by collaborating with the foreign ministry has signaled that the church is indeed 
united with the state in promoting a greater Russia through the spread of Russian 
Orthodox Christianity.”69  This symbiotic relationship has been a useful component to 
regulate the definition of Russian-ness for the wider diaspora in which both church and 
state have taken a great interest. 
Payne points out that the conjoining of religion and foreign policy was more a 
hallmark of the Putin administration than of Yeltsin; this makes sense in line with 
Yeltsin’s previously expressed hesitance to align himself with Orthodoxy over the 
democratic ideals of religious freedom.  While some collaboration certainly occurred 
especially after 1997, the clear point at which this relationship grew deep was the advent 
of the Putin administration with its goal to make Russia proud of itself again.  The 
administration’s approach to the church in foreign policy was clearly laid out in the 
National Security Concept of the Russian Federation released in 2000, which stated that, 
Assurance of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes protecting 
the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions and standards 
of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russia’s peoples.  There 
must be a state policy to maintain the population’s spiritual and moral welfare, 
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prohibit the use of airtime to promote violence or base instincts, and counter the 
adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.70 
Many of the same forces which drove the adoption of the 1997 law restricting religious 
freedom in the Russian Federation can be plainly seen in the language of the concept; the 
government saw the dominance of Orthodoxy as far more significant than simply a 
religious question, it was a matter of state security that the influence of Orthodoxy on 
Russian life be preserved.  The Putin administration has in many respects been driven by 
a suspicion of any Western influence within their perceived Russian sphere, a point made 
evident by the specific reference to foreign religious organizations in the security 
concept.  Orthodoxy, having been conflated almost completely with Russian identity by 
this point, represented a core national value which was at risk from foreign intervention.  
Likewise, the spread of Orthodox-based Russian values around the globe became a 
strategy which would strengthen and secure the Russian positionothe. 
Domestic Policy Post-1997 
 The influence of the church on Russian policy extends well beyond the realm of 
foreign policy.  Indeed, in recent history the Orthodox Church’s positions on domestic 
policy have attracted far more media attention.  Robert C. Blitt of the University of 
Tennessee College of Law recently observed that, “the ROC today enjoys unprecedented 
influence on virtually every aspect of Russian government policy, an arrangement that 
coincides with the vision set out by the Moscow Patriarchate in its Basis of the Social 
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Concept.”71  Throughout President Putin’s tenure, the government has grown to pull the 
church into nearly everything it does.  Government institutions, including longstanding 
bodies which had effectively carried over from the Soviet period, adopted their own 
unique saints and prayers.  New churches were constructed for state-owned buildings.72  
This should not necessarily be surprising, considering the circumstances of President 
Putin’s own background and inauguration. 
 A common refrain in Pres. Putin’s biographical notes is that he was unique among 
his KBG colleagues during the Soviet period for expressing a personal belief in God.  
Throughout his public life in the Russian Federation, Putin has stressed his strong 
personal religious faith while paying lip service to the state’s multi-religious character.  
At his inauguration in 2000, Patriarch Alexy did not play the same public role that he had 
in Yeltsin’s 1996 inauguration, a critical time when church support was instrumental for 
defeating a Communist Party challenger to the Presidency.73  However, Putin’s 
inauguration was immediately followed by a prayer service at the Cathedral of the 
Annunciation in which the Patriarch directed Putin, “‘to remember about the great 
responsibility of the leader to his people, history, and God,’ and…to take care of the 
people’s welfare, both material and spiritual,” and promised that, “the Russian Orthodox 
Church would help the secular authorities in their efforts to revitalise the country.”74  
Putin was given three icons, including one of St. Alexander Nevsky, Russia’s famed 
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defender and patron saint, with the direction to follow in Nevsky’s noble footsteps.  He 
left his inauguration with the assertion that, “it was thanks to the guidance of the Russian 
Orthodox Church that Russia had preserved century-old traditional spiritual and moral 
values, which would have been otherwise irretrievably lost.”75  The tenor for church-state 
collaboration in politics was clearly set by this very public exchange between President 
Putin and Patriarch Alexy. 
 One of the most significant areas where the Orthodox Church has sought to make 
itself felt domestically is in the realm of military affairs.  Like Patriarch Alexy appealing 
to the soldiers during the 1991 coup attempt, the church had always enjoyed close ties 
with Russian soldiers and a virtual monopoly on their spiritual life.  Blitt notes that, “one 
of [the] areas where the Church has tirelessly pursued the opportunity to express its views 
is access to Russia’s military.”76  A new chaplaincy program championed by Putin would 
provide Russia’s traditional faiths with military access, but was set up in such a way that 
only the Orthodox Church would be fully able to take advantage of its offerings.  For 
instance, “the terms governing the chaplaincy program require adherents of a ‘traditional’ 
religious faith to account for 10 percent of a military unit before the state will authorize 
an official chaplain.”77  Based on population figures, this renders it highly unlikely that 
Islamic, Jewish, or Buddhist chaplains of any number could find approval to actively 
serve as a unit chaplain.  Blitt takes the next step to indicate that this means the state 
directly pays the Orthodox Church for religious activities; while technically true, this 
should be taken with a grain of salt as the practice of military chaplaincy programs is also 
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widespread in many other militaries—criticism of bias in Russia’s program ought to be 
directed at the adherence percentage requirements, not the pay scale. 
 Education represents perhaps the most significant area where the church sought to 
gain an increased policy role after the passage of the 1997 religious freedom law.  With 
strong influence on education policy, the church would be in a powerful position to shape 
the mindset of future Russian citizens.  The church’s Basis of the Social Concept clearly 
lay out policy priorities in this area, declaring that, 
It is desirable that the entire educational system should be built on religious 
principles and based on Christian values…The danger of occult and neo-heathen 
influences and destructive sects penetrating into the secular school should not be 
ignored either, as under their impact a child can be lost for himself, for his family 
and for society…The Church is called and seeks to help school in its educational 
mission, for it is the spirituality and morality of a person that determines his 
eternal salvation, as well as the future of individual nations and the entire human 
race.78 
The same fear which directed pressure towards the passage of the 1997 law is here again 
evident, couched in ecclesiastical language which connects one’s personal salvation with 
the fate of the nation.  Education is the baseboard from which the Orthodox Church could 
implement its vision for a holy Russia in the 21st century, if only proper access could be 
granted.  This hope would not be fully realized during the Putin administration, but 
church influence would continue to increase and by the time of the Medvedev presidency, 
the church and its values had been carved out a place in Russian education. 
 Overall church influence can be most noticed in Russia on domestic social policy. 
As indicated above, education forms a major part of this, but so too do issues such as the 
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treatment of homosexuals in Russia or tolerance for religious dissent in the public sphere.  
Not so much a problem in the early Putin years, these areas have attracted serious note in 
international media over the past several years.  The question over gay athletes would 
face persecution over attending the Sochi Olympics in 2014, for instance, filled Western 
news discussion and social media for days.79  While such policies were not observed in 
the Yeltsin and early Putin years, the time period to which this examination has confined 
itself, important antecedents emerged at this time.  A general trend since 1991 has been 
an increase in the power of the church to influence Russian affairs as the state has found 
new manners in which to co-opt the church for its own aims.  As this process continues to 
unfold, Orthodox positions on social issues increasingly become the domestic policy of 
the Russian government. 
Conclusion 
 The Russian Orthodox Church has enjoyed a significant resurgence in influence 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Already having enjoyed greater freedoms 
under Gorbachev, the church was able to act decisively in 1991 to back the Russian 
people and new leadership under Boris Yeltsin in the August coup.  Patriarch Alexy had 
carefully built up connections within the Red Army and exercised remarkable tact in his 
public appeals, provoking dramatic responses from the people against the coup 
leadership.  This impact was perfectly typified by the image of protesters pulling down 
Felix Dzerzhinsky’s statue in Lubyanka Square and placing on its pedestal an Orthodox 
cross with the words sim pobedishi.  Amidst the chaos surrounding the collapse of Soviet 
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power, the Russian people were only too willing to fall back on their shared Orthodox 
heritage for stability, for comfort, and for group identity. 
 A profound religious resurgence took place in overwhelmingly atheist Russia 
around the early 1990s.  Vyacheslav Karpov conceptualizes this process using the term 
“ethnodoxy,” suggesting that it was Orthodoxy’s historical connection with Russian 
identity and not any real sense of belief that drove this.  For much of pre-Soviet history, 
Orthodoxy had been intimately wrapped up with the Russian state; both the Patriarchate 
and the new government were intensely aware of this and sought to take advantage as 
they were trying to develop a new Russian identity in the wake of Soviet collapse.  
Religious belief did increase throughout this period, but church power in state affairs 
increased to a far greater degree. 
 The influx of international Christian proselytizing movements brought on by 
1990’s religious freedom law created a significant problem for both the government and 
the Orthodox Church.  The Patriarchate was incensed by fellow Christians attempting to 
win converts in their land; they saw Russia as an Orthodox domain and an already-
Christian realm which did not require such assistance.  The government in kind saw the 
foreign proselytizers as an avenue for the West to push new ideas into the country which 
would undermine Russian unity and risk upsetting the volatile stability.  This led to the 
passage of a new law in 1997 which severely restricted religious freedom and laid out a 
framework for the Orthodox Church and the government to work together on policy 
initiatives.  The 1997 legislation has remained in force and operated as the guiding 
document for church-state relations since this time. 
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 Under the auspices of the 1997 legislation, the church has become more involved 
in both Russian foreign and domestic policy.  Appeals to the diaspora to extend Russian 
influence have aided both church and state, helping to further the concept of russkiy mir 
and extend the soft power of Russia across the globe.  Domestically, the Orthodox 
Church has pursued closer involvement in both military affairs and education policy—
two areas where a profound impact can be had shaping the character of the country and 
its future citizens.  Rooting education in Orthodox values is meant to inculcate that these 
values are a part of Russian identity, not only of Orthodox belief.  In each of these areas, 
the church’s policy initiatives can be seen as an extension of the overarching goal to 
coalesce a new Russian identity around the Orthodox faith and history. 
 The Russian government and the Orthodox Church have built up a new type of 
relationship since the fall of communism in 1991.  This new symphonia is rooted in 
shared goals for control of the population and influence in the new Russian state and the 
world.  Careful effort has been put into building up Russian identity around the tenets of 
Orthodoxy while avoiding the official state establishment of the religion and professing 
publicly a state policy of multiconfessional religious freedom.  With each successive 
presidential administration, the relationship between the church the state only seems to 
grow closer as the state becomes willing to support more and more church policy 
priorities and the church moves to endorse new state initiatives which do not conflict with 
its teachings. Orthodoxy has become a core component of modern Russian identity by a 
long process of careful design on the part of both Patriarchs and Presidents. 
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